3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 All Sinkiang All

Magistrates who succeed in bringing a certain area of new land into cultivation—35,000 *mu* or about 6,000 acres, I believe—receive a good mark at headquarters and are singled out for promotion. This results occasionally in money being wasted on canals along which the water will not run—"Amban's Follies" we used to call them—but it meant that ambitious Magistrates encourage the spread of cultivation in every way and see that new settlers are left alone by the tax-gatherer. For three years a settler on new ground pays no revenue, and half-rates for the next three.

It is true that moral and intellectual progress does not exist in Kashgaria. There are no schools except those attached to mosques, at which nothing is taught by the mullas but reading, writing and the Qur'an. By means of a strict censorship not only are books and all written or printed matter dealing with current events kept from the hands of Chinese and Muhammadans alike, but the dissemination in writing of news or of any ideas whatever among the inhabitants is effectually prevented. All this, no doubt, is highly reprehensible from the point of view of the democratic idealist. But after all, if the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the *summum bonum* for any community, as some people are still old-fashioned enough to believe, there is a good deal to be said for it. At any rate, in this twentieth-century world of hustle and the Yellow Press, of merciless competition and all-pervading publicity, one may be forgiven for hoping—selfishly, perhaps—that a corner of the earth may long be spared in which a peaceful, contented, simple, lovable and by no means uncivilized population exists without motor-cars or cinemas, without newspapers or telephones, without broadcasting or advertisements, without a mile of railway or even of metalled road, a land steeped in the Middle Ages, picturesque and quaint almost beyond belief—truly an Arcady of Cathay.

Of our life and work at Kashgar the part that D. and I liked best was the touring, of which we had plenty. Though the trade between India and Chinese Turkistan is strictly limited by the great length and difficulty of the Leh route, the number of Indians connected with it who are permanently or temporarily resident in the oases of the Tarim Basin is surprising. At Yarkand alone there are usually between 100 and 150 Hindu traders, most of them representing firms in one or other of two Punjab towns, Amritsar and Hoshiarpur. Sindhi money-lenders from Shikarpur ply their trade at Yangi

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

I. The Turks of Sinkiang

186
795 A. The Concept o the Unity of the Moslem World

The Moslems of Sinkiang (Turkic: Türk-e-stan 'Land of the Turks') identify themselves strongly with the rest of the Moslem World. In spite of the many divergencies in national cultures of the various elements which constitute the Moslem world, there is a supernational religious civilization which unifies them all. The feeling and firm conviction of unity of all believers finds expression in the Koran as well as in the traditions and the extensive Islamic literature, and in propaganda slogans which became current since the turning of the century, such as: ittihad ve terakki 'u 'unity and progress', or Muslimlerin hakki birles "Moslim people unite'. The rest of the world is looked at as being apart from the Moslem World - being the domain of war, whereas the area under Moslem jurisdiction is considered the domain of peace.

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795 This feeling may have its roots in the history of the propagation of Islam where political institutions and allegiance went hand in hand with religious institutions and allegiance. The acceptance of the religion of Islam, Din-al-Islam, meant also the acceptance of the Moslem political state. The allegiance with a definite political tinge of many Moslems who do not live today under Moslem control remains with the leaders of the Moslem World. They may feel an even stronger attachment to the Moslem leaders than they do to their own non-Moslem political rulers, as has been the case in Sinkiang under Chinese domination. The allegiance and recognition of the Turks of Sinkiang went to the Ottoman Turkish Empire and later to the leaders of Western Turkestan rather than to their Chinese rulers. It is reasonable to assume that the Moslems of Sinkiang today identify themselves much more strongly with the world of Islam than they do with the Communist block. They think of themselves in terms of being Moslems and not in terms of being Communists. No matter how much indoctrination has gone into uprooting this allegiance to the Islamic world, it will take a whole new thoroughly indoctrinated generation to forget the strong sentiments and attachments to the rest of the Moslem world.

668 B. Turkic Nationalism

Besides having supernational allegiance and sentiments of attachment to the Moslem world, there is also a strong nationalistic movement among the Turks of Sinkiang (called milli tahrik). They consider themselves as being a part of Turkestan as a whole and not as belonging to China. They view themselves as Turks, and not as Chinese nationals. They do not regard their position as a national minority in China as the answer to their national

175 completed by March 1943. Soviet Russia not only withdrew its
648 military forces but also retreated from its economic expoitation of Sinkiang. The Soviets capped the main oil well north of Urumchi and shipped back to Russia all the movable machinery from the oil refineries and the gold, copper, and iron mines which they had set up in Ili, Chuguchak, and in the Altai area, and from the factories they had built in Urumchi and other cities.

This Russian retreat was, however, far from complete. The Soviets maintained their consulates in all the larger cities of Sinkiang with a staff of several hundred people. At these consulates the Russians left military guards. At Urumchi a company of Soviet infantry with a strength of at least four hundred men was left behind to guard the consulate. Other consulates were guarded by units of ten to fifty men each. Other units were left behind to guard the gold, copper, and iron mines in the Ili and Chuguchak regions as well as the oil wells at Wusu and at Urumchi where the valuable machinery that could not be removed was protected by these troops. Soviet troops also continued to guard the airfields at Kulja, Urumchi, Kashgar, and Turfan. In each Soviet
175 consulate the biggest department was the propaganda section.
648 These departments distributed among Turks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz,
• 208 and Mongols pamphlets printed in Soviet Russia. Agents of the consulates traveled throughout the province giving out these pamphlets and explaining the contents to the illiterate. The pamphlets gave favorable accounts of the Turkic people within the Soviet Union and contained material on methods of agriculture, irrigation, and animal husbandry. Altogether, the Soviet consulates concentrated more than before on the support and protection of the nationality groups who had started to fight the Chinese administration. Although the Soviets did not establish Communist Party cells among these nationality groups, they attempts to infiltrate their leadership. And since Chinese policy aimed at the suppression of this nationality movement, the nationality groups depended on the intervention of the Soviet consulates with the Chinese administration for the protection of the lives of their leaders. In several cases the Soviet representatives prevented execution and in other cases secured the release of imprisoned nationality leaders. As a result the Turks, the Kirghiz, and the Kazakhs, and Mongols, had to accept the orders of Soviet agents in their dealings with the administration of Governor Sheng.

175 VIII. Soviet Efforts to Regain Power in Sinkiang.
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By 1944 the defeat of Nazi Germany enabled Soviet Russia to
[669] return to an active policy in Sinkiang. The Soviets supported a Kazakh uprising which broke out in the Ili valley on November

S 668 908 208 545 4. Cultural corps

In the army, cultural work corps promoted propaganda by means of entertainment. In local dances and songs, the Cultural Work Corps of the Fifth Army (originally the Sinkiang National Army) in the summer of 1951 promoted the Party's Nationality policy and the Resist-America Aid-Korea movement in Sinkiang. They visited various villages and regularly attracted an audience of from three cr four thousand to ten thousand people. The members included thirteen minority groups living in Sinkiang. Some of them went to Peking in 1953 and presented a performance of 21 acts before the audience in the capital.

S [563] [484] [648]

The visit was returned by the Central Nationality Dancing Corps of Peking which sent a performing team of 140-odd members to Sinkiang in April, 1955 to celebrate the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. It spent more than half a year in Sinkiang and returned to Peking on November 13 after having visited ten special districts, three autonomous chou, seven counties, two state farms, three mines in Sinkiang and two cities (Lanchow and Su-chou) in Kansu. It performed 112 times before audiences of various nationalities totalling more than 439,000 people.

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N *668 208 IV. The Methods of Propaganda.

Besides those already mentioned, the Communists are using many other methods of propaganda. Parading, signature drives, circulation of pictures and pictorial stories, large-scale welcome meetings for important personnel sent from Peking, lantern slides and movies produced by the Party and the government, theater activities such as opera, drama, dance, and concerts all have been used as means of propaganda. The public accusation meeting is another form. No matter what the main target of a particular accusation meeting may be, whether a landlord or the U.S.A., the accusation always carries out the propaganda of the day, whether it be the Resist-America Aid-Korea movement or land reform. Other kinds of meetings are equally useful. "Model Peasants Rallies," held in the main farming districts of Sinkiang are the place to promote propaganda for increasing production as well as for denouncing germ warfare.

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N *668 796 *[563] [791] [651] A. Festivals

Festivals are always good opp;rtunities for promoting propaganda. In Northwest China where most of the minority groups are followers of the Moslem religion, the Islamic festivals are used as a time to express the thoughtfulness of the Communist government. For instance, during their celebration of the three major Moslem festivals of the year, the butchery tax on beef and mutton consumed by Mohammedan communities is exempted. Further-